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• 1 media/Thumb 141.png 2024-11-08T14:24:44-05:00 "Colonial Policy" 18 Benito Sylvain critiques the unfettered militarism of the French campaign in Dahomey plain 2024-12-03T17:27:40-05:00 09-16-1890 Translation: In the first issue of this newspaper, we noted the habit in Europe of disproportionately amplifying the victories won over weak people. And we invoked, on this subject, the witness of the celebrated admiral Dumont-d'Urville, who summarized a judicious analysis of the battle of Navarin and the taking of Algiers, saying: "It is unfortunate for a nation to see exalted, as we do, such ordinary things; it detracts from the great things."
  
  Here is what an eye witness of the principal events in Dahomey has just show with grave revelations, how the thirst for glory, the desire to be "illustrious," pushes the heads of the French expedition to perpetrate and to aggravate a situation that is already too troublesome, and that, at the risk of bringing France the embarrassment of a Tonkin infinitely more dangerous and less productive.
  
  It results, in effect, from the declaration of Mr. Siciliano, the representative in Dahomey of the firm Mante and Borelli of Marseille, that Admiral Cavelier de Cuverville only dreamt of bumps and bruises. This general officer had charged Father Dorgère—who knows next to nothing about the country—to present King Kondo or Bazou unacceptable propositions which absolutely conflict with the instructions of the French government. Mr. Siciliano's long stay on the Slave Coast, his familiarity with the customs of the country, his actual participation in the latest events, all this gives his words an authority that is incontestable and uncontested. His declarations even more important than was supposed for such adventurous merchants, with a tendency to claim State interference in the profits of their business. Since most of the European powers' colonial conquests have no other origin.
  
  Mr. Siciliano, it is true, was not given an official mission, but the minister of the navy, at whose disposition he was put, judging that his great knowledge of the countries could be useful, gave him a letter introducing him to Admiral Cuverville, while at the same time Mr. dr Freycinet was indicating to him the conditions in which peace could be achieved, and which are the following: "The cessation of Kotonou, the opening of the country to Europeans, the end of human sacrifices, the forbidding of the king to cede his territory to any power other than France." Thanks to the prejudice of the authorities of the conquering army, negotiations could not even be undertaken with King Badazin, who is disposed to a treaty. The Admiral wants to let gunpowder do the talking and have the glory of offering Dahomey to France.
  
  Likewise the late Admiral Courbet, when he was so harshly abusing the ministers whom he treated as "Pulcinellas," particularly rebuking them for not enlarging the field of combat by an official declaration of war in China. Who knows, however, what would have happened, if this immense contingency had been taken?
  
  That the Jean-Barts and Dugay-Trouins think that the role of the navy and soldier is to fight and to march forth, and that the cannons of their vessels are destined to do more than exchange peaceful salutes with the English squadron, nobody is surprised. But it falls to those who weigh the heavy responsibility of directing the State to retain this warrior spirit when it becomes unwelcome.
  
  What is the cause of the Dahomeyan conflict? No one really knows. There were exaggerations, insignificant facts blown out of proportion, in order to find a pretext for an intervention: there was talk of "avenging the flag," as if the incursions of the King of Dahomey on French territory had a real importance.
  
  We can only come into such a debate with the most extreme circumspection. We would be happy here to reprint the sensible language of a Frenchman, Mr. Françis Magnard, editor-in-chief of the Figaro, who, after having drawn up a report of this dire colonial policy, concluded thus:

  Since we already have Whydah, Porto-Novo and Kotonou, well fortified, since the Dahomeyans are not trying to despoil us of them, since—and this must be the supreme argument—the possession of these three points is amply sufficient for our "colonial expansion" in this region, let us be content with the status quo, leave a small military force in sight of the coast to keep the respect of the Dahomeyans, but do not risk giving us a prolonged war with these people who, after all, seem quite resolute.
  
  ...what a nasty animal,
  when we attack it, it defends itself.

  
  It is undeniable that fathers of families and French taxpayers must think that too much money has already been spent, and too much blood has been spilled in this adventure. And if one is to make serious estimations, it will require another four thousand men and forty million francs to reach a solution—which will be no less illusory. Because the only result obtained up to now is distressing proof that African brutality can often be surpassed by European brutality.
  
  France, we have the firm hope, will soon become aware of the situation and will know, as a civilized people, how to turn it to her glory.
  
  Benito Sylvain
  
  
  
  
  
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